Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of Constitutional Reforms in Hungary

The thesis is clear: Viktor Orbán’s constitutional reforms have significantly contributed to democratic backsliding in Hungary. Since his re-election in 2010, Orbán has systematically eroded democratic norms. Scheppele defines democratic backsliding as a process where elected leaders use their mandates to dismantle the constitutional systems they inherited, consolidating power and weakening opposition (Scheppele, 2018, p. 545). Constitutions are intended to distribute power among various state organs, ensuring reciprocal controls and cooperative governance (Britannica, 2023). However, democratic backsliding occurs when safeguards against undemocratic constitutional reforms are absent, allowing politicians to consolidate their power unchallenged.

Furthermore, through constitutional reform, Orbán gained control over legislative and executive institutions and the media, shifting them from neutral entities to pro-Orbán platforms (Britannica, 2023). Media independence was compromised in 2010, with government-aligned media dominating newspapers, radio, television, and online platforms. Levitsky and Ziblatt highlight the significant role of media in influencing public opinion, noting that during Donald Trump’s campaign, he received more media coverage than Hillary Clinton, impacting public perception (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Similarly, Orbán uses media coverage to his advantage, ensuring positive attention for himself and negative coverage for the opposition, a tactic that consolidates power and exemplifies democratic backsliding.

The methods employed by Orbán to consolidate power are not unique to Hungary. Similar tactics have been observed in other countries experiencing democratic backsliding, such as Poland and Turkey. In Poland, the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has also sought to undermine judicial independence and control the media, drawing parallels to Hungary’s experience. In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has used constitutional reforms to extend his powers and suppress opposition, illustrating a comparable trajectory towards authoritarianism.

In conclusion, Viktor Orbán’s constitutional changes have significantly contributed to democratic backsliding in Hungary. Since his re-election in 2010, Orbán has systematically altered the 1989-1990 constitution, eroding democratic norms and consolidating power. By increasing judicial seats and appointing loyalists, limiting political participation, and controlling the media, Orbán has transformed Hungary from a democracy to a semi-authoritarian state. This case exemplifies the impact of constitutional reforms on democratic decline and the consolidation of power. The broader implications of Hungary’s experience highlight the importance of safeguarding democratic institutions and norms to prevent similar backsliding in other countries.