Democratic decline - A concept beyond 'democratic' states
Democratic decline - A concept beyond 'democratic' states
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Published - 26 October 2023
Chaitanya Nitin Harak
abstract :
abstract :
Autocratic legalism is a form of manipulation of legal procedures to by an incumbent government that can be applied to regime systems regardless of their democratic level. This suggests the conclusion that ‘democratic decline is the breakdown and seizure of institutions by incumbents from their originally liberal and distinct position in order to promote the incumbents and their agenda.
Countries across the world today are governed by various forms of regimes. These range from openly ‘democratic’ regimes to ‘hybrid’ regimes to ‘totalitarian’ regimes. The developed ‘Western’ states are considered ‘functional democracies’ by a majority of researchers. At the same time, most developing Asian states are often considered ‘hybrid’ democracies or ‘hybrid’ states. Along with this, the remaining states of the world are considered ‘broken’ or ‘totalitarian’ regimes, where there is lack of public freedom. This essay focuses on ‘hybrid regimes’ which as described by Levitsky & Way are states where there are “formal democratic institutions” which are used to administer and govern (2002, p. 52). Incumbents in such states often use laws to manipulate and maintain power using constitutional means.
The debate on democratic backsliding, as covered by Scheppele, has conventionally been limited to nations that have been largely accepted as ‘democratic’ by the ‘Global West’ (2018, p. 547). Thus, the study of ‘democratic decline’ has been limited to countries which are formally accepted as democratic. However, the concept of ‘democratic decline’ extends beyond the few economically developed nations of the ‘West’. The concept is misrepresented to be possible in ‘democratic’ regime systems alone because the fundamental argument is for the decline of established ‘democratizing’ policies of government and not the decline of ‘democratic norms’.
Image: Ju Peng/AP
The Westernized interpretation of ‘democratic backsliding’ does not acknowledge that autocratic legalists can seize power in states which are not just democratic but also hybrid regimes states, such as China. Thus, the argument is that autocratic legalism is a form of state subjugation that is not limited to ‘democratic’ regimes, and the Chinese hybrid regime, specifically post-2012 with the rise of Xi Jinping, can be used as an example to suggest otherwise.
The appointment of a new leader for the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 2012 marked the introduction of a legalist government in China. The new CCP General Secretary, the de facto leader of the People’s Republic of China (China), Xi Jinping rose to power through constitutional means. Xi’s use of nationalist issues and radicalization of the public to gain popularity is a classic example of charisma building. It is assumed when such charismatic personalities gain power, with a populist support comparable to Xi, they are more than likely leaders of nations shifting towards democratic decline. It is commonly thought that such regimes will slowly turn into totalitarian regimes. This process, classically termed as autocratic legalism, is part of the steps K. Scheppele pointed out (2018, p. 571).
Autocratic legalism, as termed by Scheppele states that “a charismatic new leader comes to power, propelled by the growing impatience that the electorate feels” followed by “a constitutional revolution” which aims to silence opposition (2018, p. 546). This definition as suggests that autocratic legalism is based on the concept of state subjugation, regardless of what type of regime system is in power. The concept of ‘democratic backsliding’ argues therefore, that established state institutions are compromised, and policies are manipulated by incumbent state forces to deny the public freedom and equality which was constitutionally stipulated.
The Chinese hybrid regime is distinct from most dictatorships and since it is a one-party system with the party having higher status than individuals. The policy in China requires various ‘elected’ CCP members and delegates from local CCP branches all over China to congregate on a five-yearly basis to elect a group of individuals that form the government. These chosen individuals then elect a CCP leader, who heads the government over the five-year period. This process is inscribed into the CCP constitution, which also set a term limit on CCP leaders for a maximum of 2 terms. While not a classical from of ‘democracy’, it still fits into the framework of a competitive authoritarian state as described by Levitsky & Way, where “formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority” (2002, p. 52). Notably, the style of democratic institutions implied here is those institutions which are constitutionally established and remain relatively independent from government control.
As Levitsky & Way stated, hybrid regimes like in the case of China, can still have institutions which are relatively independent (2002, p. 53). However, this is something that can be compromised very easily in hybrid regimes given the ability of the government to hide information from the public. Thus, when autocratic legalism is mixed with competitive authoritarianism, a hybrid regime shifts further towards authoritarianism. This presents an impression of ‘democratic decline’ in a regime system which is not a classic ‘Western democracy’, supporting the notion that ‘democratic decline’ can happen in hybrid regimes as well. This, in turn, suggests that autocratic legalism is a form of manipulation of legal procedures to by an incumbent government that can be applied to regime systems regardless of their democratic level. Therefore, it is possible to overlay the steps that Scheppele highlighted onto competitive authoritarian states such as China, where the incumbent government has used legal procedures to solidify its position and create an even more draconian state.
Image: Leo Ramirez/AFP
Scheppele points out in the article how “rewriting a constitution to design a system suitable for an ambitious new leader” is a step that is most autocratic legalists follow in their plan to subjugate the state (Scheppele, 2018, p. 554). A perfect example of this type of constitutional subjugation is when Xi, in his aim to remain leader of the CCP for a period beyond what was allowed by the constitution, took the matter into his own hands. This power seizure was achieved using the country’s main legislative body, the National People’s Congress where 99% of the members voted in favor of the resolution to remove presidential term limits in China. This essentially established ordinance for Xi Jinping to remain in the presidential position for life (Doubek, 2018). This is a classic example of the many ways that Xi instituted a form of autocratic legalism in a bid to ingratiate himself into a position of power for life.
Another form of such legal manipulation to further the ‘democratic decline’ in a state which had been undergoing democratization for over 40 years, was the transfer of power from the government to CCP department with regards to news media and entertainment. The already controlled news media and other forms of entertainment will now, under Xi’s directive, be monitored by the CCP rather than the government. This is an example of autocratic legalists using law to promote their ideological agenda by hijacking government bodies (Buckley, 2018). Simultaneously, the establishment of Anti-Corruption body with Xi as head, to silence members of the CCP that oppose him, is a direct example of how legalists subvert law to introduce methods of silencing opposition (Horsley, 2018). Along with that, the use of government bodies to directly influence and exert power on the government policies is a classic example of legalism. ‘Leading Small Groups” are a direct example of how Xi and other CCP members are influencing policy work in China by being part of policy-making bodies (Huang, 2014). This supports the framework of ‘democratic decline’ as a universal concept which can be observed in states which are not traditional ‘liberal democracies’.
This concept of state subjugation can also be further witnessed in China with the incorporation of CCP into the initially independent judiciary of China. The “supervision by people's congresses and the procuratorate” of judiciary is a direct example of how China under Xi has transformed into a more draconian and CCP run state (Smith & Merkley, 2019). This form of interference in formerly independent organization provides a direct link to the method of state capture that is practiced in China by the Xi regime. The centralization process followed by Xi is clearly a departure from the former institutionalized style that predecessors has brought in and will further blur lines between the government and CCP (Wong, 2023). Therefore, the use of CCP by Xi in managing the state as a whole proves that Chinese governance is directly linked to the steps that Scheppele lined out in the article on legalism.
As suggested above, the concept of autocratic legalism as proposed by Scheppele on the debate of ‘democratic decline’ can therefore applied to hybrid regime systems as well. China is an empirical example of how hybrid regimes which were undergoing democratization can shift towards ‘democratic backsliding’. Hence, the analogy of autocratic legalism introduced by Scheppele can be claimed as limited. The concept of a state going through ‘democratic decline’ can also be applied as a hybrid regime undergoing ‘destruction of formerly independent institutions’ by a totalitarian government. The view presented by Scheppele suggests that ‘democratic decline’ is the breakdown of liberal institutions by incumbents to promote their dictatorial agenda and support their power grab. This, however, can also be superimposed onto hybrid regime systems such as China, where incumbents post-2012 are using constitutionalism and legalism to strengthen their positions in government and promote individual agendas.
Therefore, the argumentation on ‘democratic backsliding’ provided by Scheppele presents a limited, and literal understanding of what ‘democratic backsliding’ is and restricts it to a ‘Westernized’ concept of democratic states. Using China as an empirical source, it can be argued, that ‘democratic decline’ can also happen in originally hybrid regimes where established ‘democratizing’ institutions are compromised by reducing their independence from authoritarian bodies of the state. This suggests the conclusion that ‘democratic decline is the breakdown and seizure of institutions by incumbents from their originally liberal and distinct position in order to promote the incumbents and their agenda’ which is a concept beyond ‘democratic’ states alone.
References
References
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