The rise of a Eurosceptic far-right: a new identity for French Nationalists
The rise of a Eurosceptic far-right: a new identity for French Nationalists
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Published - 12 March 2024
Chaitanya Nitin Harak
abstract :
abstract :
Identity politics in Europe has evolved over the last few decades. The rise of far-right politics in the EU is primarily occurring in the periphery, where voters feel neglected from the EU and urban European identity. Marine Le Pen's ability to gain power despite remaining in opposition demonstrates the growing importance of group identity in the matured European identity politics.
In Europe, today identity politics presents itself in a complex manner where a multitude of historical, cultural, and sociopoliticalfactors influence European politics. The diverse and varied history of Europe results in a nuanced form of identity politics; one that greatly influences the domestic political dynamic and policymaking. Exploring this complex identity politics in Europe offers insights into how, for example, Eurosceptic individuals in countries are able to make political gains despite remaining out of power. Identity politics in Europe reveals a political landscape dominated by popular and charismatic leaders, anti-European Union (EU) and anti-government sentiments, and a nationalist rhetoric. The change in population demographics of France over time, especially in the last 40, through an influx of refugees from outside the EU has led to increased support for populist and identity politics.
Marine Le Pen, the leader of French 'Rassemblement National' party, exploits the growing identity politics trend in the EU for her electoral gains. This phenomenon underscores the basics of identity politics, raising nationalistic voices against an 'outgroup.'Kamphausen’s insight on European identity as a mirror as well as a wall, reinforces the notion of group identity while differentiating it from others (Kamphausen, 2006, p. 28). This concept reintroduces a sense of European exclusivity, forming a bedrock for identity politics in Europe, where populists like Le Pen find resonance amid complex European identity-based fault lines.
Articulating her views staunchly in support of a distinctly continental French identity and the populist movement in France, she directly underscores the structure of identity politics in the country. Like most populist leaders, Le Pen, herself being a Eurosceptic,also suggested that France withdraw from the Schengen agreement after the beginning of the Arab Spring and then during the European migrant crisis in 2015 (Wright, 2022) (Mondon, 2012). Both these events resonated strongly within France, where many were skeptical of the refugees coming to their country. While EU policy states that asylum-seekers can find refuge in the EU, Le Pen, during the 2022 elections, claimed that if she was elected, she would take drastic measures to limit immigration under this policy (Reuters, 2021).
Articulating her views staunchly in support of a distinctly continental French identity and the populist movement in France, she directly underscores the structure of identity politics in the country. Like most populist leaders, Le Pen, herself being a Eurosceptic,also suggested that France withdraw from the Schengen agreement after the beginning of the Arab Spring and then during the European migrant crisis in 2015 (Wright, 2022) (Mondon, 2012). Both these events resonated strongly within France, where many were skeptical of the refugees coming to their country. While EU policy states that asylum-seekers can find refuge in the EU, Le Pen, during the 2022 elections, claimed that if she was elected, she would take drastic measures to limit immigration under this policy (Reuters, 2021).
Image: Thomas Samson, AFP
Given that the incumbent French government of Emmanuel Macron does not reject this policy, many find Le Pen’s proposal reassuring. This support for Le Pen has shown that the concept of ‘European integration’ and ‘refugee acceptance' has been increasingly rejected by the French population. This implicitly highlights the maturation of European identity politics, where ‘outgroups’ are actively disliked (Kamphausen, 2006).
Le Pen was briefly the leading candidate in the 2019 French elections, where Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen were the only two candidates left, with rising support for her. Her party even stood first in the European Parliament elections of 2019 which followed the former (MacShane, 2019). She increased her stronghold in the provinces and small cities of France slowly. The growing polarization of the political landscape is a distinctive attribute of identity politics and populism. Kuhn (2019, p. 1221)highlights exactly this concern regarding oversimplification of politics into libertarian vs. nationalist politics in the threats to European integration.
As stated above, Le Pen has maintained a critical position for the EU. She even proposed a 'Frexit' in 2012 and then in 2017 an exit from the Euro (Banks, 2016) (Mortimer, 2017). She since revised her stance to one about reforming the EU, all the while remaining a Eurosceptic. She has remained vocal about French traditions and identity, again pointing towards a ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ stance which is a feature of identity politics. She supported EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ in critical fields such as climate, however, would like France to withdraw from the EU Green deal (Garric, 2022). She stated her aims to withdraw France’s participation in the EU electricity market. While she has often supported the actions of Orban’s Hungary and Morawiecki’s Poland regarding EU policy, the difference between Poland and France is that France can fiscally sustain without EU aid (Wright, 2022).
Image: Christophe Petit Tesson, EPA, Keystone
Euroscepticism has a substantial influence on the political landscape of Europe, triggering changes in voter outlook and the rise of populist parties. Noury & Roland (2020, p. 8) also examine the different dimensions of politics within the European Parliament, where Eurosceptic approaches have become as significant as the conventional left-right division, emphasizing the increasing control of anti-establishment and Eurosceptic parties in European politics (The Economist, 2017). Euroscepticism in France has led to a drastic fall in pro-EU sentiments, along with the development of new divisions between citizens with differing perceptions of European integration (Kanani, 2020) (Armstrong, 2022).
Le Pen used the idea of European deindustrialization to show that the French population is losing out. Along with this, Le Pen also blamed the adoption of the Euro over the Franc as the reason why prices rose in France and why the French locals now were paying more for the same standard of living (Front National, 2011). Mohdin (2017) states in an appropriate manner how “Le Pen lost the vote but won something better”; considering that even though she lost the 2019 French elections narrowly, the prospect of almost becoming President forced the normalization of her ideology within the continental French population who felt progressively lost out.
The dissatisfaction with the existing establishment and popular support for Le Pen seems to indicate that group identities within France are increasingly alienated. Schmidt (2013, p. 16) notes this rise of Eurosceptic sentiments, especially on the far-right which connects with Kamphausen’s (2006, p. 30) argument regarding ‘ingroups’ & ‘outgroups’. There is a growing effort to consolidate the French identity and the simplest way to achieve this in Le Pen’s view is to separate France and EU. Signalling similarities with maturing European identity politics, Le Pen is trying to appeal these alienated group identities, alienating others in the process.
In such a situation as France, where voters feel disenfranchised and alienated; Le Pen's RN, which speaks strongly in favor of continental French identities, is most likely to be favored by the French. Wheeldon (2022) talks about how Le Pen’s party is trying to appear progressively ‘professional’ and ‘typical’ so voters can see that they can lead government and are a better alternative to the Renaissance[1]. This transformation of French politics is a direct example of identity politics maturing in the EU. The mobilization of voters based on topics such as pension, cost of living, the 'laïcité' concept in France, etc. shows that European integration at an all-time low; the group identities of continental French voters is the calling card of politicians like Le Pen (Šima, 2021).
Image: Sarah Meyssonnier, Reuters
This idea of identity politics maturing is visible not only in France but also throughout the EU. Populism has come to play a large role in the EU Parliament as well as other EU institutions (Pew Research Center, 2023). More and more parties have started asking for increased nationalist reforms in the EU, with the French Rassemblement National of Le Pen leading in many cases. Kanani (2020) noted that identity politics in the EU will remain a major fault line in the coming years. She proposes the idea that “there is no turning the clock back” on identity politics and populism in Europe and that what has been created cannot be destroyed. Wodak (2021, p. 101) mentions the integration of “border and body-politics” in identity politics, increasingly defined by language and ‘ethnicity and culture’. The constant referral to a blending of national politics and identity politics is a mark of European politics maturing into ranked politics of identity.
Schmidt (2013, p. 9), in her article, talks about populism in the EU; and speaking of ‘input legitimacy’, she discusses how populism has gradually referred more and more to the Eurosceptic sentiments of populists and ‘ingroups.’ This rise has created a ‘constraining dissensus,’ forming cleavages between libertarian & neoliberal Europeans and nationalistic & xenophobic Europeans. This rise of anti-EU sentiments in the wake of anti-immigration movements is a highlight of the politics practiced by individuals like Marine Le Pen. Kuhn (2019, pp. 1216-1220) refers to the Hooghe & Marks (2009, p. 5) article on ‘constraining dissensus’ as well, talking about how this can lead to issues such as the Brexit referendum, which has the ability to effect European integration. This convergence of thoughts on populism seems to point to the idea that identity politics and populism have been more and more visible as time has passed and Le Pen’s 2012 Frexit idea runs along the same line.
Image: Christophe Petit Tesson, EPA, Keystone
Increasing disputes amongst the ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’ have led to a polarization of politics, and populist Le Pen is a perfect example of its results. Matured identity politics in the EU has led to politicians like Marine Le Pen appearing increasingly favorable to populations like France which have faced a growing number of immigration issues (Gougou, 2022). The appeal of identity politics to the seemingly neglected identities of these groups, shows that identity politics has matured in Europe. Everyone has an identity, and though complex, these are highly effective fault lines which appeal to their emotions. The growth of political cleavages and political polarization has gradually led such individuals like Marine Le Pen and parties like RN to become increasingly influential in domestic politics. This has prompted a growing number of politicians to adopt more and more populist stances to attract voters, shifting the domestic political discourse in a further polarizing direction (NEWS WIRES, 2023).
Conclusion
The rise of far-right politics in Europe is primarily occurring in the periphery, where voters feel neglected from the EU and urban European identity. The rise of populists like Marine Le Pen is dependent on appealing identities of those who feel disregarded. The RN's electoral gains through appealing the continental French identity shows that identity politics in the EU is maturing. The identity politics pf Europe is openly anti-EU, indicating the escalating tensions within European groups and their identities. Marine Le Pen's ability to gain power despite remaining in opposition demonstrates the growing importance of group identity in the matured European identity politics.
[1] This is the ruling party in France, led by Emmanuel Macron
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